by David Haenke
  
                      
I. Ayn Rand and the Whites
Ayn Rand’s work and life (and the cult which she formed around her 
ideas – ‘The Collective’) present a number of themes which are of 
interest to the nationalist intellectual: Jewishness, Anglo-Saxon-ness, 
neoliberalism, Nietzscheanism, cultism, individualism, Modernist 
architecture, aesthetics… Her political stances late in her life are of 
interest to us as well: she became increasingly conservative, if not 
reactionary, by the early 1970s, and denounced, via her polemical 
essays, the New Left, the student movement, feminism, environmentalism, 
hippie-ism and ‘Black Power’, and her vitriolic denunciations of these 
tendencies – especially the hippie movement – are amusing and make a 
good few points, and are to be recommended for that reason. Regarding 
Rand’s work as a whole, some (such as Gregory Johnson, of 
Counter-Currents Publishing) believe that certain of Rand’s ideas and 
books can be co-opted to ‘white nationalism’ (whatever ‘white 
nationalism’, in this instance, may be).
But Rand is a problematic writer – and figure – for any intellectual,
 nationalist or non-nationalist, and the more one knows about her, the 
more problematic she becomes. My own experience is as follows. I came 
across Rand over ten years ago after reading an essay on her and 
Atlas Shrugged (1957) in Colin Wilson’s classic (but now regrettably out of print) book of literary criticism, 
Eagle and Earwig (1965) and after that, read both of her two great novels – 
Atlas- and 
The Fountainhead (1943) – in succession and enjoyed them a great deal. I then left the books on the shelf for a number of years. Then the movie 
The Watchmen (2009) came out (an adaptation of the DC comics series of the same name). One of the characters in 
The Watchmen
 – Rorschach – was based on two other comic book characters (called ‘Mr 
A’ and ‘The Question’) who were both fedora-wearing vigilantes and 
devotees of the Randian philosophy of Objectivism. The Question and Mr A
 had been created in the 1960s by Steve Ditko, the brilliant, eccentric,
 reclusive co-creator of Spiderman for Marvel Comics: Ditko was a 
follower of Rand’s philosophy and went on to produce a number of comic 
books which are propaganda for Rand and Objectivism. Because of the 
hoopla around 
The Watchmen
 movie and Ditko in 2009, I picked up Rand’s novels again and delved 
into her non-fiction (which is mostly polemical ranting), and read more 
about her life in these biographies: Barbara Branden’s 
The Passion of Ayn Rand (1986), Nathaniel Branden’s 
Judgement Day: My Years With Ayn Rand (1999) and Jennifer Burns’ 
Goddess of the Market: Ayn Rand and the American Right
 (2009). My earlier enthusiasm for Rand and her novels was somewhat 
tempered by reading these books, and any naive admirer who takes Rand 
and her ideas at face value will be taken by surprise by the revelations
 of the less elevated side of her character – and those of her 
followers. (Perhaps it’s similar to someone being an admirer of the 
science fiction of L. Ron Hubbard and not knowing much about Hubbard’s 
life).
Regarding the politics: what bearing does Rand’s life and work have 
to nationalism? Rand promulgated a (in her view) water-tight philosophy,
 or pseudo-philosophy, called Objectivism, which is neoliberal (or, as 
the Americans would say, libertarian) and definitely non-fascist and 
non-racialist; and, being a Jewish-Russian intellectual, she wrote many 
polemics against Nazis, fascists, dictators, racialists, Southern 
segregationists, and so forth. This neoliberal and anti-racist 
philosophy tied in perfectly, according to her followers, with her 
fiction: they state that all the heroes and heroines in her novels and 
plays behave in a perfectly correct Objectivist manner. I myself don’t 
believe that this is entirely true: one can’t sum up Rand’s characters –
 or stories – by Objectivism alone, and this becomes evident the more we
 look at the Objectivist philosophy and when we discover that 
Objectivism, and certain of the Randian heroes’ values, morals, 
behaviour, emotions, are at odds. Rand believed that her heroes and 
heroines were ‘rational’, but much about them doesn’t strike me as being
 rational in the conventional sense of the word. (I think most of the 
concepts Rand speaks about – ‘reason’, ‘rationality’, even ‘reality’ – 
have to be put in quotation marks, because she doesn’t exactly take 
these words to mean what we take them to mean).
It’s for this, then, that we can put Rand’s characterisations of her 
philosophy, and the characterisations made by her (often sycophantic) 
followers, to one side when we attempt to come to a definition of what 
Rand is. Henceforth, Trevor Lynch of Counter-Currents makes these 
comments, in a review of the 2011 movie adaptation of 
Atlas-:
 Although Rand opposed racial nationalism on 
philosophical grounds (with a sentimental exception for Zionism, of 
course), there is still much of value in her novels for racial 
nationalists. Rand started out as a Nietzschean, and her novels offer 
powerful defenses of aristocracy and critiques of egalitarianism, 
democracy, mass man, and mass society. All these elements are in tension
 with her later philosophy of reason, individualism, and capitalism. 
Indeed, Rand felt the need to reframe, revise, or simply suppress her 
earlier, more Nietzschean writings. But the “sense of life” of her 
novels is so in keeping with the spirit of fascism that her first novel We the Living
 was made into a movie under Mussolini, a fact that Rand later 
obfuscated with tall tales and a revised version of the novel. (The 
Italian We the Living , by the way, remains the only good film adaptation of a Rand novel.)…
Atlas Shrugged, moreover, lends itself to a racial interpretation. 
Atlas Shrugged is about how a creative and productive minority is 
exploited by an inferior majority because of the acceptance of a false 
moral code (altruism) that beatifies the weak and pegs the worth of the 
strong to how well they serve their inferiors. When one asks “What is 
the race of Atlas?” it all falls into place. The Atlas that upholds the 
modern world is the white race, which is being enslaved and destroyed by
 the acceptance of a false moral code (racial altruism) that teaches 
that non-whites fail to meet white standards only because of white 
wickedness, and that whites can only expiate this racial guilt by giving
 their wealth and power and societies to non-whites…
Rand’s aesthetic is deeply fascist—and Socialist Realist—with its 
emphasis on man’s heroic transformation of nature through science, 
technology, and industry. Rand also had a taste for Nordic types. All of
 her heroes are tall, lean Nordics. Rand, born Alissa Rosenbaum, was 
not…
On that note, one of the of the most astonishing things about Rand’s 
fictional world is how white it is. There are no African-Americans in 
her novels (if they are, they have escaped me). This, combined with 
Rand’s famous penchant for leggy, Anglo-Saxon heroines and tall, lean 
handsome Anglo-Saxon heroes, could be construed as an implicit racialism
 – in much the way Tolkein’s novels (and the film adaptations by Peter 
Jackson) were. Kevin MacDonald calls this ‘implicit whiteness’ – that 
is, certain TV shows and films, with a mostly all-white cast, appeal to 
white audiences because of a subconscious racial, cultural and national 
identification in the viewer. (This crosses over to popular music, as 
well: American Country music is obviously aimed at a white audience, but
 so is heavy metal as well. Metal music more or less sticks to one basic
 theme – Europe in the Dark Ages, or medieval period – and remains a 
white, male, European phenomenon). The appeal of Rand’s work is in part 
due to implicit whiteness.
One has to make a distinction between implicit and explicit whiteness. The excellent American TV show, 
Breaking Bad
 (2008-2012), makes heroes out of rather ordinary, middle-class white 
Americans and villains out of Mexican immigrants (who are uniformly 
portrayed as either degenerate, evil, criminal or stupid, or all four). 
The two heroes of the series are white everymen, as evinced by their 
surnames – Jessie Pinkman and Walter White – and, obviously, the 
scriptwriters, producers and directors are throwing this explicit 
racialism, or at least, hinting at its existence, in order to titillate 
the (mostly white, I imagine) audience. The creators of the show are 
self-conscious: that is, they are aware of what they are doing. In 
contrast, I don’t believe that Rand knew what she was doing. Rand was 
merely recording, more or less faithfully, the world she lived in. Her 
leggy heroines and square-jawed, chiselled Nordic heroes with cruel 
mouths were a product of her milieu and so weren’t an instance of 
explicit whiteness.
To get a good idea of this milieu of Rand’s, one should sit down and watch the great TV series 
Mad Men
 (2007-2012), which attempts to duplicate everything about early 1960s 
America – right down to ashtrays, women’s gloves and racial attitudes – 
to the last detail. Most of the series is set in Manhattan (Rand was a 
Manhattanite, and extolled, in her fiction, New York city as the 
greatest city in the world and the acme of human evolution) and 
sometimes in Los Angeles. The latter is shown to be bathed in a golden 
sunlight and comes across as an Aryan paradise, and is achingly 
beautiful. It becomes clear from watching the show that the producer and
 writer of the series (Matthew Weiner, a Jewish-American) is a great 
admirer, like Rand, of white America, WASP-dom and sturdy Anglo-Saxon 
men and ice-cold Hitchcock blondes, and that he wrote and produced the 
series as a kind of love letter to that past. It’s now, in 2013, hard to
 understand, but Rand’s New York – a white city, where Afro-Americans 
were almost invisible, and any immigrants were white European, where the
 couture was ultra-stylish – was exactly like the New York portrayed in 
the show. Rand, I think, took this whiteness and all it entailed for 
granted: she probably believed that it would never change – which is why
 she reacts with such shock and revulsion to the social and political 
changes which took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It would 
have been quite a disappointment for her to see her beloved America (of 
the stylish Don Drapers) change, almost overnight, to one of 
counter-culture ‘hippies’ and ‘yippies’ (many of the latter 
Jewish-American) and rioting Afro-Americans putting cities to the torch.
In that connection, even after the counter-cultural revolution of the
 1960s, it took a long time to change the racial composition of America,
 and to stamp out the nordicism and Aryanism out of the American popular
 culture (and the political culture – it’s speculated, today, that 
Reagan couldn’t have won the US presidential election in 1980 with 
today’s racial composition of the electorate). Recently, I saw an 
episode, broadcast in 1981, of the great American TV soap 
Dallas
 (1978-1991) which shows a pool party for young people at the Southfork 
residence. A handsome, impoverished young medical student (with a 
seriously fashion-deficient eighties-era mullet), Mitch Cooper (Leigh 
McCloskey), is invited there but upon arrival finds that all the people 
there are rich, unlike himself. He vents his fury at them when he’s 
asked to participate in a pool-wrestling match for $50. (For those who 
want to know, a pool-wrestling match is when young men have young women 
in bikinis sit on their shoulders and wade into the pool: the mounted 
women attempt to topple one another and push one another into the 
water). Such sums of money shouldn’t be squandered on frivolous 
entertainments, he thunders: he knows the value of money because he 
works hard for it, at two jobs (one as a waiter, the other as a parking 
valet). (Incidentally, his dogmatism and unwillingness to compromise, 
his inability (bordering on being an obnoxious character trait) to fit 
in with other people in certain situations, his prudery, makes him a 
kind of quasi-Randian hero). As you can imagine, all the young men there
 at this event are in excellent physical shape (without the aid of 
steroids or human growth hormone) and have that bronzed Californian look
 about them, and the young women are pretty, long-legged and voluptuous 
and untoned (as women of that time tended to be). Now, in 2013, the 
viewer can only guffaw at Mitch’s righteous indignation at the young, 
beautiful rich people – because, being bronzed, blonde, blue-eyed and a 
handsome specimen himself, he looks exactly like them (and is 
wolf-whistled at by the young women when he walks in). He is the Dallas,
 Texas, version of a Howard Roark or John Galt, and lives in an 
attractive milieu (one can imagine a F. Scott Fitzgerald writing a paen 
to these rich young beautiful folk of the South in the 1970s and 1980s).
 Suffice to say, Obama’s America today is different: were the same scene
 shot today, we’d have a Hispanics, a Jewish-American homosexual, a 
kick-boxing black lesbian, a transsexual, perhaps a one-legged dwarf, 
all thrown in; that means no WASP demi-gods and demi-goddesses, no 
beautiful young white women in bikinis… The culture, and with it, the 
values, have moved on. The pool party in Dallas, Texas in 1981, and the 
WASP Manhattan in the 1960s, were, from Obama-liberal’s point of view, 
the embodiment of evil in American culture, and have to be destroyed: 
the whites have to be replaced by non-whites. Which is why, in the 
second part of the 
Atlas- adaptation, 
Atlas Shrugged II: The Strike
 (2012), the character Francisco d’Anconia, a blue-eyed Chilean who is 
the descendant of Castilian-Spanish nobility, is played by the 
conspicuously Mestizo Esai Morales. (A minor character in 
Atlas-,
 Eddie Willers, is played by an Afro-American). Such are the times. At 
the recent presidential inauguration, a gay Hispanic recited a poem, and
 the president made a speech in which he held up the homosexual rioters 
at Stonewall as embodiments of the American ideal.
II. Ayn Rand and Afro-Americans
Colin Woodard makes a convincing argument in 
American Nations: A History of the Eleven Regional Cultures of North America
 (Viking Press, 2011), that the USA is composed of not one nation but 
ten. New York and its surrounding suburbs is one such nation, which 
Woodard calls ‘New Amsterdam’. Founded by apolitical Dutch merchants, 
and settled, later, by Jews and outcasts and cast-offs from Western and 
Eastern Europe, the ethos of this nation – or rather, city-state – is 
commerce (unwilling to make waves, it acceded to the 1776 revolt against
 the English, and took the side of the Union in the American Civil War, 
only reluctantly). New Amsterdam doesn’t have any sense of group 
identity – unlike Woodard’s other ‘nations’, e.g., Yankeedom, the Deep 
South, the Left Coast – and is truly a ‘nation of immigrants’. It is 
here that Rand found her spiritual home. As a Russian Jewess immigrant, 
and a neoliberal, she fit right in.
The only trouble with the New Amsterdam-ers are that they are 
completely oblivious to the rest of the country – they don’t understand 
that the rest of America isn’t like New York. Years ago, the 
Jewish-American mayor of New York, Michael Bloomberg, launched a 
Gestapo-style ‘stop and search’ law enforcement program, which involves 
stopping and searching (primarily, it seems) young Afro-Americans for 
weapons. Now, Bloomberg, with sublime New Amsterdamer arrogance, 
believes that New York gun control laws can be extended to the rest of 
the US – e.g., to the Deep South and the heavily redneck, white cracker 
‘Greater Appalachia’ (the name given by Woodard to this region). We see 
that same New Yorker solipsism in in 
Mad Men.
 The Manhattanite characters speak of the Southerners, at the time 
engaged in their fight against desegregation, with contempt and disdain,
 and incomprehension, even though, at the same time, they are portrayed 
as being unconsciously racist and oblivious of the black people (and, by
 extension, the “oppression” of black people) in their own New Amsterdam
 nation-state.
All this has to be kept in mind when one reads Rand’s comments on 
race and immigration. As a New York Jewess, and an immigrant, of course 
she is going to be for immigration. That doesn’t necessarily mean, 
though, she was in favour of white racial replacement, which manifests 
itself in our culture in a number of ways (e.g., replacing d’Anconia 
with a Mestizo, Eddie Willers with an Afro-American). Rand died in 1982,
 and if we are to take that prior-mentioned episode of 
Dallas
 from 1981 as a representative sample of the cultural ethos of that time
 (Rand was an ardent TV watcher) – then we wouldn’t be mistaken, I feel,
 in surmising that Rand just wouldn’t have understood white racial 
replacement, or, for that matter, the ascendancy of Barack Obama.
So, intellectuals of Rand’s generation grew up in a milieu of white 
ethnic homogeneity, which they took for granted: they considered it be a
 constant. Were they alive today, one would like to consult them and 
really drill down on the question of white racial replacement. Would 
Rand have approved of London, in 2013, being less than 50% British? Of 
immigrants from Africa and India displacing the British and becoming the
 new ethnic majority? What would Jean-Paul Sartre, who died in 1980, 
have thought of his beloved Paris becoming an African and Muslim 
majority city? (We’re not talking about a small African and Algerian 
quarter in Paris, which existed in Sartre’s time: we’re talking of an 
African and Arab majority pushing out the French). We know that Sartre 
was a Maoist, an inveterate radical, and so forth, but one has to ask 
what he really, really have thought.
Related to the question of white racial replacement is the 
(explosive) Afro-American question, which really is the main question in
 all of US politics. Rand wrote an essay denouncing the South, 
Racism
 (1963), one which is fairly typical of the times (interestingly, one 
finds that the essay starts out attacking the evil Southerners, and then
 ends up with a polemic against affirmative action, the civil rights 
movement and Black Power – one could look at it as a conservative 
reaction to the Afro-American civil rights cause, or an expression of 
Jewish-American disdain for the 
schwartzes, or both).
Rand didn’t take into consideration the argument of the 
anti-desegregationist, which was as follows: Afro-Americans are 
disproportionately inclined to crime, especially violent crime (robbery,
 rape and murder), more than whites; they are mendacious, and 
disproportionately reliant on the welfare system); they tend to be, when
 they get into politics, more corrupt than white people. The corollary 
of all this is that whites should distance themselves, as much as 
possible, from Afro-Americans, and that means segregation – and laws 
against miscegenation, because the characteristics of the Afro-American 
race are mostly genetic, the product of nature, not nurture.
Now, in 2013, we know that the anti-desegregationist, racialists and 
so-called white supremacists of the 1950s and 1960s lost. Rand, in her 
way, helped by writing her essay – but one shouldn’t make too much of 
that, and the fact that she was Jewish-American, because a vast array of
 forces (liberals, hippies, beatniks, humanist priests, communists, 
anarchists), Jewish and non-Jewish, were arrayed against the South, not 
only in America but overseas as well: the South had the entire world 
against it in the 1960s, and Rand’s essay – and all the essays of all 
the Jewish-American intellectuals, each and every one of whom opposed 
segregation – were merely a few of the last straws which broke the 
camel’s back.
But the question is, were the anti-desegregationist right about the 
Afro-American racial character? I won’t answer that question here 
because of reasons of political correctness. But, if we are to answer 
the question, we should look at the evidence: today’s American cities 
where Afro-Americans are the majority: East St. Louis, Illinois; 
Chicago, Illinois; Detroit, Michigan; Camden, New Jersey; and, in the 
south, Atlanta, Georgia; Birmingham, Alabama…
In that connection, the reader should really be advised to read Paul 
Kersey’s bog, Stuff Black People Don’t Like. Mr Kersey is the author of 
Escape from Detroit: The Collapse of America’s Black Metropolis
 (2012). If half of what Mr Kersey says is true, well then, these 
Afro-American cities are, to say the least, incommensurate with 
Objectivism and Randian values, and, indeed, they are incommensurate 
with neoliberalism as a whole. The economics alone in these cities is 
different from that of a free-market society, which is characterised by 
trust, the rule of law, freedom from corruption, respect for private 
property: instead of Adam Smith’s ‘Invisible Hand’, we have, in a city 
like Detroit, to use one of Mr Kersey’s highly memorable phrases, ‘The 
Highly Visible Black Hand’. Ayn Rand rails against, in her 
The New Left: The Anti-Industrial Revolution
 (1971), the left-wingers who castigate ‘black capitalists’ for being 
sell-outs and ‘Uncle Toms’. I’m sure that, in those radical times 
(America in the late 1960s and early 1970s), there were plenty on the 
Left who were attacking ‘sell-out’ Afro-Americans who tried to better 
their position by getting into business: after all, this was the time of
 the Black Panthers, which was a self-declared Marxist organisation. 
But, in 2013, the ‘Black capitalists’ aren’t under attack from the Left:
 no, they are under attack from their fellow citizens – in Chicago, 
Detroit and other cities. It’s a brave Afro-American who dares set up 
shop in Chicago, a city which (as the crime statistics show) is more 
dangerous now than Afghanistan: he risks a bullet in the head or the 
back. (Mr Kersey’s blog recently reported that Chicago fast-food 
restaurants use bullet-proof glass to separate the patrons from the 
staff, and that the patrons receive their food through a kind of hatch 
in the glass barrier…).
One really wants a standard orthodox Objectivist to read Mr Kersey’s 
blog and formulate a response to it. How is Rand’s gospel of 
individualism, neoliberalism, reason, rationality, non-coercion, and so 
forth, meant to fix Detroit? The answer is, of course, that it can’t. 
But then, Objectivists, neoliberals, conservatives, understand all of 
this, and so do all American whites and for that matter 
Jewish-Americans. It’s why they prefer not to live in downtown Detroit 
or Chicago or Birmingham. It’s why (more often than not) they express 
resentment when their tax dollars being siphoned off in order to 
subsidise these cities; it’s why they seem to be so obsessed by the 
problems of socialism, big government, the demoralising effects of 
welfare, the freedom for whites to own guns to protect themselves from 
‘criminals’ of an undefined race (or, conversely, the right of 
government to seize guns from ‘criminals’ of an undefined race) and so 
forth. They are talking in code. It’s an evasion and hypocrisy which 
infects every corner of American intellectual and political life. 
Objectivism ought to face up to it: after all, isn’t it a philosophy 
about acknowledging ‘reality’ and denouncing ‘evasion’ in all its forms?
 But it doesn’t, it prefers to talk in code like the rest of the 
mainstream American Right.
We can speculate, then, that when modern-day American Randians and 
Objectivists are denouncing ‘moochers’ and ‘looters’, they are really 
denouncing you-know-who. But this is a far cry from Rand, or at least, 
Rand’s original intentions, because, as we know from Rand’s novels, the 
evil socialists and looters – the Ellsworth Tooheys, Jimmy Taggarts, 
Oren Boyles, Wesley Mouches and the like – are all white. As Whitaker 
Chambers points out, they are mostly New Deal types straight out of the 
1930s and 1940s – white liberals and socialists (and, incidentally, 
there is nary a Jewish-American among them). But one can give the ethic 
of 
Atlas- a racialist 
interpretation: that is, transpose the novel’s contrast of ‘producers’ 
and ‘parasites’ to the racially-divided and ideologically-divided 
America of the present – with the sober, white, middle-class Republican 
Party voters on one hand and the Obama-ites, the corrupt Detroit city 
councilmen and women, the Jesse Jacksons and Reverend Al Sharpes, on the
 other. Trevor Lynch, in his article, suggests that one can make such an
 transposition, and I find such a suggestion fascinating – and 
explosive. But that would be taking us far from Rand’s original intent.
III. Ayn Rand and Life
Ayn Rand is what I call a ‘vitalist’ intellectual – in the same 
tradition as Nietzsche, Henri Bergson, George Bernard Shaw, all thinkers
 who were of great interest to fascist intellectuals, and now to 
post-war nationalist intellectuals. Supposedly, the vitalists 
(especially Bergson and Nietzsche) were irrationalist, which should put 
them at odds with Rand, who is a rationalist. But this difference – if 
it is one, i.e., if these men really are ‘irrationalist’ – doesn’t have 
any bearing on their vitalism and Rand’s, both of which suffer from the 
same problems.
If a thinker makes a bad argument, he isn’t wrong, necessarily, in 
his conclusions – and vice versa. Darwin’s argument for evolution by 
natural selection in 
The Origin of the Species
 (1859) is flawless, but his theory of evolution by natural selection is
 not necessarily true – and a good many distinguished intellectuals 
didn’t think, at the time, that it was true. We should keep this in mind
 when looking at Rand’s philosophy. A few of her key arguments for her 
positions are bad, but does this badness necessarily invalidate her 
positions? Yes and no. Rand seems to have really believed that good 
ideas needed a rigorous argument, and that her conclusions were true 
because they flowed, indubitably, from premises which indubitably true 
(believing that the virtues of individualism, capitalism, selfishness, 
rationality and the rest were deducible from ‘axioms’ such as ‘A is A’, 
and so forth). I myself don’t share her biases: if someone makes a bad 
argument for something, that person may not necessarily be wrong.
So what is Rand’s main (vitalist) argument? Rand makes a distinction 
between mindless people and mindful ones, between those who don’t think –
 who refuse to use their reason, who evade, who fail, or refuse, to 
acknowledge ‘reality’ – and those who do. The distinction between the 
two types is a moral one: the evaders are bad, if not evil; the 
reason-users are good. ‘Life’, ‘living’, ‘survival’, are the sources of 
all human ideas of good. Man, alone of all the creatures, can choose to 
end his life or not, and hence ideas of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are a matter 
of choice. Man’s reason is his means of survival, his means of earning a
 living and his defence against predators and the elements. Tigers have 
claws, strength and speed, birds have wings, but man has only his mind. 
If he forgoes his use of reason, he forgoes his means of survival, and 
is pursuing death – the opposite of life, and thereby the opposite of 
all good. He is thereby immoral… The anti-reason types, the 
irrationalists, actually preach an ethic of death, of self-destruction, 
and are thereby evil.
This is the argument in the John Galt speech in 
Atlas-, and essays such as 
The Objectivist Ethics (1961) (of course, Rand does a lengthier, more detailed presentation of these theses than I do here). What is wrong with it?
If we reflect on it a little, we will see that many of the 
anti-reason types don’t simply don’t drop dead and die. A friend of mine
 told me that he was reading a volume of Rand on a Melbourne tram, when 
he was confronted by a drunken indigenous man who hassled him for money.
 My friend argued to me afterwards that the indigenous man – who, 
according to him, was a man of low intellect, little to no education, 
few prospects in life, and so forth, and definitely a ‘moocher’ – was, 
from the Objectivist point of view, anti-reason and thereby anti-life. 
In response to this, I argued that the man in question did eke out a 
survival, reason or no: a miserable existence, to be sure, but it was 
living. Either he didn’t use his reason, but survived nonetheless, or he
 did use it, like everyone else, and, consequently, couldn’t be 
classified as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Everyone has a pair of lungs, and uses 
them to breathe, and survive. One can’t make lung use as a basis of 
ethics: it’s tautologous to say that everyone uses lungs, just as they 
use their kidneys, liver, motor neurone system… The fact that the 
indigenous man in question uses his reason to survive is tautologous, 
just in the way that he uses his heart, lungs, liver, kidney, to 
survive. Just about everyone who is living is using their reason, then, 
and so consequently we can’t use this criterion to differentiate between
 ‘good’ and ‘bad’.
We can see that – the survival of the ‘bad’ and ‘evil’ people – in 
Rand’s novels. The ‘anti-reason’ types – who are, consequently, 
‘anti-life’ – actually do a fine job of living, i.e., the James Taggarts
 and Lillian Reardens. America itself, which, in Rand’s novel, becomes a
 broken country (under the sway of socialism and irrationality), 
experiencing (to put it mildly) a drop in its standard of living. Many 
people end up dying in famines and accidents, and so forth, but they do 
continue to survive. It’s a wretched existence, and all the bad guys in 
the novel who do live to the end (e.g., James Taggart) live a wretched 
existence, but it’s still survival. The anti-reason, irrationalist types
 don’t drop dead, like birds which have been infected with a deadly 
disease and then fall, like stones, from the air in mid-flight…
The author Michael Prescott puts this much more succinctly and 
elegantly than I, in a post entitled ‘Ayn Rand and “Is-Ought”‘, at:
http://michaelprescott.typepad.com/michael_prescotts_blog/2005/04/ayn_rand_and_is.html
Rand equivocates – that is, she uses the same term to 
mean two different things. The term in question is “life,” which she 
takes as the standard for all moral values. Early in her argument “life”
 means “biological survival,” but later (when applied to humans) it 
suddenly means “the life proper to a rational being.” She has smuggled 
in the concept of what is “proper,” what “ought” to be, when all she is 
entitled to talk about is what “is.”
Now, it could be maintained that Rand is not equivocating because, 
when talking about humans, she established that reason is the way – in 
fact, the only way – for humans to survive. Thus a life “proper
 to a rational being” would be the only possible way for such a being to
 live at all.
Objectivists do, in fact, make this argument. Ayn Rand, they say, proved that reason is man’s only means of survival.
I take issue with this. Ayn Rand did not prove any such thing; she merely asserted
 it. Her assertion, though accompanied by much rhetorical hand-waving, 
is not backed by any empirical evidence. Indeed, it is contradicted at 
many other points in Rand’s writings. For instance, she often inveighs 
against the irrationality of “savages” (her term). Yet “savages,” 
however irrational they may be, manage to survive and even sometimes to 
flourish. In certain circumstances, such as being stranded on a desert 
island, a “savage” would have a much better chance of surviving than his
 “civilized” counterpart. If “savages” can survive while being 
irrational, then rationality, however desirable it may be, is not essential to survival.
Or take an example closer to home. I would be considered irrational 
by Objectivists, since I hold many anti-Objectivist ideas and, even 
worse, am a former Objectivist who is now an apostate to the faith. 
Nevertheless, I am able to survive — and in fact earn a 
comfortable living at a job that gives me great creative satisfaction. 
If I am irrational, and if Rand’s assertion is correct, then how can I 
survive, much less flourish?
Indeed, how can anybody? How did humans ever make it through the 
Stone Age, or the Dark Ages, or other periods characterized by 
“irrationality,” at least in Objectivist terms? Given that Rand 
described even modern-day American society as “irrational,” presumably 
none of us should be surviving — yet we enjoy the highest standard of 
living in history.
Rand is apparently aware of this problem. She tries to solve it (or, I
 would say, evade it) by insisting that she is not advocating “survival 
at any price,” but only a worthwhile kind of survival, a 
survival that allows humans to achieve their creative and intellectual 
potential. This sounds persuasive, since most of us want to do more than
 just survive; we want to thrive.
But merely stating what we want to do is not equivalent to a
 reasoned argument – and Rand is not logically entitled to make this 
particular jump. She has previously argued that biological survival
 — survival of the fittest, which can mean nothing but “survival at any 
price” — is the standard for all living things. To be consistent, she 
must hold that “survival at any price” is the standard for humans as well. To switch to a different standard in midargument is unjustified, no matter how much polemical firepower she employs.
What Rand might have said is that reasoning is among the various modes of survival available to humans, and that in some (not all) circumstances it is the most useful mode. But this more nuanced approach is foreign to her absolutism.
Closely related to this is an additional objection which can be 
extended to all the vitalist philosophies, and not just Rand’s, i.e., 
the philosophies of George Bernard Shaw, Nietzsche and others. A simple 
organism like an amoeba is alive, is an instance of life, so surely we 
should ‘affirm’ it, say ‘yea’ to it? But, if life, living, and so forth,
 is the source of all good, how can we differentiate – in terms of value
 – between an amoeba and a human being? How are human beings superior to
 the amoeba? Indeed, how can we say that one human being is superior, 
morally more good, possessing of a higher value, than another?
Evola takes a similar line of criticism in his writing on Nietzsche in 
Ride the Tiger: A Survival Manual for Aristocrats of the Soul
 (1961). Reading Rand, it becomes especially pertinent, because, after 
all, her books are about nothing but differentiations. Take this passage
 from 
The Fountainhead:
Roark stood on the cliff, by the structure, and looked at
 the countryside, at the long, grey ribbon of the road twisting past 
along the shore. An open car drove by, fleeing into the country. The car
 was overfilled with people bound for a picnic. There was a jumble of 
bright sweaters, and scarves fluttering in the wind; a jumble of voices 
shrieking without purpose over the roar of the motor, and overstressed 
hiccoughs of laughter; a girl sat sideways, her legs flung over the side
 of the car; she wore a man’s straw hat of slipping down to her nose and
 she yanked savagely at the strings of a ukulele, ejecting raucous 
sounds, yelling “Hey!”. These people were enjoying a day of their 
existence; they were shrieking to the sky their release from the work 
and the burdens of the days behind them; they had worked and carried the
 burdens in order to reach a goal – and this was the goal.
He looked at the car as it streaked past. He thought that there was a
 difference, some important difference, between the consciousness of 
this day in him and in them. He thought that he should try to grasp it. 
But he forgot. He was looking at a truck panting up the hill, loaded 
with a glittering mound of cut granite.
Shouldn’t the life-worshipping vitalist look at these revellers in 
the passage above as an instance of ‘life’, noisy, Dionysian, 
affirmative ‘life’? But it’s obvious that Rand finds them offensive, and
 clearly contrasts their conduct, their attitudes, their typology (their
 species, even) and Roark’s.
I understand this differentiation. I often feel it when I come across
 certain types of immigrant in the streets of Melbourne: the noisy, 
jabbering, gesticulating man, shabbily dressed, yelling on a mobile 
phone in his own language at the top of his voice; he is fecund, this 
type of man, and is always accompanied by an equally ugly and 
shabbily-dressed (and often pregnant) wife, pushing a pram, with little 
miniature versions of themselves running about. What I feel for this 
sort of man is a revulsion, and a sense of distance – that he is, 
compared to many of my own kind, on a lesser plane – and that he 
certainly doesn’t belong in this country. What’s more, I feel that he is
 an ‘insult to Life’ (‘Life’ with a capital ‘L’) and everything good. 
Fellow whites of mine who think that his presence here is ‘good for the 
economy’ are just ignoring the existential reality of this man, and, 
consequently, may as well be on another world. Unfortunately for me, 
however, such feelings, insights, sensations, are difficult to quantify –
 much more difficult than the numbers which appear in an economic model.
 The conservative blogger Steve Sailer has the same problem when he 
noted, in a blog post, that the ‘tackiness’ of Mexican immigrants to 
America ‘got him down’. Tackiness! Isn’t this a value-judgement? Of 
course it is.
But this is at the root of the problem. By all rights, I should 
celebrate the fecund, jabbering, gesticulating, avaricious denizens of 
the slums that this man came from as an instance of ‘Life’, the ‘Life 
Force’: but I can’t convince myself to. Rand has the same problem. She 
can’t condemn certain people for not using their reason, because they 
are: just about everybody is using their reason, otherwise, according to
 her logic, they wouldn’t be surviving. Which is why she constantly has 
to revert back to metaphors: ‘death’, ‘death in life’, are meant in the 
same way that we talk about ‘the death of a city’ (i.e., Detroit) – 
Detroit really isn’t dying (the citizens of it are very much alive and 
aren’t going anywhere soon), Detroit is undergoing a deterioration, a 
decline, from a previous state.
As Prescott points out, Rand and the Objectivists wanted their 
value-judgements, aesthetic judgements, moral judgements, political 
judgements, to be deducible about ‘axioms’ – ‘axioms’ which in turn came
 from ‘reality’. It seems that if such judgements didn’t have this 
quality, they wouldn’t be objective, what is the case, true whether one 
likes it or not. In turn, the people who disagreed with Objectivism and 
Rand, or who just didn’t live up to Rand’s preferred type, wouldn’t be 
guilty of ‘evading reality’. Indeed, the enemies of Objectivism wouldn’t
 end up meeting with a premature, sticky end – i.e., dying – as a result
 of their defying ‘reality’ and thereby chasing ‘destruction’ and 
‘death’ (just like in the infamous train crash in Atlas-, in which 
several ‘irrationalist’, ‘whim-worshipper’ housewives, intellectuals, 
journalists, trade unionists meet a grisly end because of (it’s implied)
 their ‘irrational’, ‘evasive’ beliefs – by dying in the train, they 
suffering the punishment of angry God, a God we may identify with Rand’s
 ‘reality’).
I don’t have these same commitments, philosophically, as Rand, and I 
don’t believe that the distinction between the subjective and objective,
 in human beings, is so clear cut. I ask: aren’t the Randian heroes 
subjectivists, even spiritualists, who spend more time in the world of 
the imagination and the spirit than in the ugly, squalid and sordid 
world that confronts them? Aren’t Roark, Galt and the residents of 
Galt’s Gulch rejecting reality? Aren’t Roark (an architect) and Galt (an
 engineer and physicist) dwellers in the world of the subjective, the 
mind, rather than in the real?
It’s a truism that one sometimes can attain something by not trying 
to obtain it, or even working against it: in Buddhism, one may reach the
 elevated spiritual status of an enlightened one by in fact rejecting 
Buddha’s path to Buddhism; likewise, one may attain the blessed state of
 the residents of Galt’s Gulch – a kind of anarcho-capitalist 
Shangri-La, which is perhaps quasi-Buddhist as well – by rejecting 
‘reason’, ‘reality’, and all the tenets of Objectivism…
One of the conclusions I draw from all this is that, for the 
nationalist movement to survive (metaphorically, that is), we in the 
movement need to be constantly making value-judgements – 
differentiating, not only between whites and the likes of ‘fecund 
immigrant man’ sketched out above, but also between the good and bad 
whites. Anything white, is good: this ‘axiom’ of the movement (in its 
present state) must be rejected and therefore we must cease being a 
lost-dog’s home for the refuse of white society, some of whom find 
acceptance in the movement that they wouldn’t find elsewhere in normal, 
non-political white society. If this is élitism, so be it…
IV. Ayn Rand today
There has been a revival of interest in Rand’s ideas in America since
 2008 (or, at least, the perception of a revival – which, here, is the 
same thing). Why this revival? The answer has to do with the presidency 
of Barack Obama and the present political situation in America.
Quite a few conservative and Far right commentators have pointed out 
the similarities between Obama’s ideology and that of the African 
socialist dictators (Hunter Wallace has made an intriguing comparison 
between America today and the West African nation of Mali in the 1960s).
 This is true enough, but in my view the closest parallels are between 
Obama’s America and America during the time of the Reconstruction in the
 ten years after the American Civil War. During the period of 
Reconstruction, centralised, federal Yankee America attempted to impose,
 on the defeated South, what the Southerners called ‘Negro rule’. 
Corrupt Afro-American politicians, who went on to embezzle state 
finances, were put in to power, and outrageous welfare schemes (the 
‘Freedman’s Bureau’), which saw disproportionate amounts of government 
money be allocated to Afro-Americans, were set up. At the same time, 
resistance groups – like the Klan, the White League, and others – 
appeared and tremendous grass-roots efforts were made by Southerners to 
elect pro-white, pro-segregation Democrats. Eventually, the North lost 
interest in its social engineering program in the South and withdrew, 
effectively allowing the South to make its own laws and treating it, de 
facto, as a separate nation. Now, in 2013, America finds itself in the 
same situation: Obama-ism is Yankeeism in new clothes. The 19th century 
Southern intellectuals always held that the abolitionism of the Yankee 
North was merely one plank of the Yankee platform – which was one of all
 sorts of destructive tendencies (feminism, socialism, anarchism, free 
love-ism, spiritualism, and endorsement of race-mixing between whites 
and Afro-Americans). The Yankees today adhere to a similar destructive 
(depending on your point of view) platform: gay marriage, lesbianism, 
marijuana legalisation, amnesty for illegal Mexican immigrants, 
compulsory ‘racial socialism’ and the high taxes needed to support it, 
the blocking of oil exploration and frakking, state subsidies of 
electric cars that don’t work, gun control, destructive lifestyles like 
that portrayed in (the Jewish-American) Lena Dunham’s hit TV show 
Girls
 (2012-), federal deficit-spending, dollar devaluations… Support for all
 this is not uniform throughout America: Yankees, New Yorkers, and 
Californians vote for this stuff; Southerners and those in the resource 
rich states of what Woodard calls ‘The Far West’ (Wyoming, Idaho, 
Montana, Utah and others) don’t.
Race is intertwined with all of this, of course, but so is Obama’s 
socialist philosophy – which is, in Rand’s terms, the ‘gospel of need’, 
the philosophy of the ‘moocher’, the ‘bum’, the philosophy of ‘am I not 
my brother’s keeper?’. Obama’s socialist philosophy is also profoundly 
egalitarian – everything to him is about ‘fairness’: in his inauguration
 speech, Obama declared that the America idea was ‘equality’, which, as 
we on the Far Right know now, means to him reducing everything to the 
lowest common denominator, not just materially, but spiritually.
In addition to his calls for ‘fairness’, he constantly implores 
Americans to give amnesty to illegal immigrants, and more money to 
Afro-Americans and Hispanics, on the grounds of pity, compassion, 
brotherly love – the ethic which is the same as that of the ethic of the
 bad guys in 
Atlas-. If one re-reads 
Atlas-,
 one can see (well, at least I can see) the parallels between the Obama 
ideology and the evil ideology of the ‘moochers’ and ‘mystics’: the 
concordances hit one like a blow to the solar plexus. America is heading
 down a Randian track, and one can understand how right-wing, 
Republican-voting Americans (among them, white Southerners) vibrate in 
sympathy to Rand, even if they don’t, as conservatives and Christians, 
don’t agree with all of her ideas. Philosophy is meant to be true for 
all times and all places, but right now, Rand’s philosophy is an 
American thing.